SUMMARY FINDINGS OF THE WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION

From the Proceedings of
The Inaugural Conference on International Approaches to Nuclear & Radiological Security (IANRS)
September 29 to October 3, 2002 – London, UK
Hosted By
The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation
Co-Hosts:
The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MinAtom)
&
The Russian Research Center, Kurchatov Institute

The IANRS initiative launched in 2002 created an international community of experts from 27 countries organized in seven working groups to accelerate and expand international programs to secure nuclear and radiological materials and prevent nuclear terrorism. The inaugural IANRS conference examined how the events of 9/11 added complexity to the problem of preventing nuclear proliferation, securing nuclear and radiological material, and preventing nuclear terrorism, and sought to respond to the international community's call to develop a global response. Accordingly, the principal focus of the conference was developing international approaches to accelerating and expanding programs that secure nuclear and radiological materials. The working groups discussed strengths and vulnerabilities in the current programs and systems and developed strategies to make physical security of nuclear material comprehensive.

IANRS Working Group A, Radiological Threat Reduction set both long and short-term goals. The short term goals were to focus on radiological sources of immediate concern, while long term goals were to create mechanisms by which states could cooperate to regulate and control radiological materials within their own borders based upon internationally agreed standards. This group highlighted a number of issues which would have to be confronted to meet these goals. These included agreeing clearly defined goals, dealing with questions of public perception and trust, helping with the lack of adequate accounting of radiological materials, and questions concerning the adequacy of funding of security efforts and training and assistance of budgets. It proposed actions in technical implementational and political spheres and sets standards by which the results of considered action could be judged.

Summary of Radiological Threat Working Group Recommendations: Presented by Professor Leonid Bolshov, Director IBRAE, Nuclear Safety Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation.

Goals

Short-Term: – Focus priorities on radiological sources of immediate concern while assisting nations to develop the infrastructure and capabilities necessary to provide adequate materials security and emergency response.

Long-Term: – All states should regulate and control radiological materials within their own borders, based upon internationally agreed upon standards. Nuclear and radiological materials should be the responsibility of individual countries. Emergency response system in each country should be prepared to respond to the radiological threat. International cooperation should be developed. Public and decision makers should be prepared.

Issues:

1. Clearly defined goals must be developed to help focus the efforts.
• Do we wish to seek a complete elimination of the threat?
• Are we willing to entertain the thought that the threat might be beyond our capacity to contain and the use of an RDD is inevitable?
• How is failure defined in this effort and what is an ‘acceptable’ amount of loss or disruption within that definition?
2. Public perception and mistrust of nuclear and radiological materials (Radiophobia).
• Lack of trust in governments by the public
• Lack of trust and transparency between governments
3. Lack of adequate accounting of radiological materials in all countries.
• Need to develop worldwide inventories that can be independently and readily verified.
• This should be tied to some form of international agreement that provides a mechanism for enforcement.
• Should materials be leased and returned to specific countries after use rather than sold outright?
4. Address the scope of the problem and where to focus priorities.
• Thousands of radiological sources lack adequate security or are ‘orphaned.’
• Need to prioritize efforts to provide maximum reduction of the threat.
5. Concern that funding of security efforts must be provided to countries in need of assistance, while allowing them to develop their own individual systems for control and accounting.
6. Develop and train, and assist other countries in developing and training, emergency response procedures and personnel.

ACTIONS

• The acquisition of radiological material for use in a weapon should be made more difficult and expensive (to prevent it completely is probably impossible).
• We should plan for failure, that is, we should be prepared to take action to remediate the effects of such a weapon.
• Our plans should include means to minimize the effects of radiological weapons, including the psychological effects based on a commonly-held nuclear phobia.

• Know the world wide inventory and catalogue it.
• Prioritize the protection and control of radiological materials
• Set up appropriate protection, control and accounting.

• The ability for timely damage assessment.
• Prioritize damage and remediation (100% remediation is probably unaffordable).
• Learn to live with imperfection – it might take several incidents with huge costs before a common-sense and practical solution takes place.

• Need to have worldwide standards for determining who (or what country) may be permitted to have or use radioactive materials. (Does a country have the political stability, infrastructure, or leadership appropriate for use of radioactive materials?)
• Need to have adequate laws and sanctions governing the use and storage of such materials.
• Need to develop honest and realistic assessments of the consequences of a radiological attack.
• The populace needs to be educated about the real dangers of radioactive materials so that fears are not exaggerated.

1. Monitoring of accessibility of IRS using a comprehensive analysis of all data.
2. Development of recommendations and programs for immediate actions to restore adequate IRS control and protection.
3. Development of the concept and programs on improvement of national and international systems for monitoring and accountability of IRS, RW, RM.
4. Development of scientific and analytical base for justified recommendations on prevention, countermeasures and mitigation:
• Systematic approach to the area
• Realistic models
• Full-scale analysis of different scenarios, including cascade effects
• Prioritization of possible events on risk base
• Utilization of practical experience in mitigation of real accidents
5. Adjustment of Emergency Response Systems:
• Specific response procedures
• Adequate methods and models for consequences assessment and recommendations for mitigation
• National special technical support centers
• International system of communication and technical support
6. Training of first responders and decision makers:
• Computer systems for training
• Table-top exercises
7. Adequate perception of radiation risks by population and decision makers:
• Information
• Education
• Consolidation of expert opinions
8. Perfection of legal base in radiation safety:
• For normal everyday use
• For emergency
9. Life cycle management of IRS (leasing, terrorist resistant technologies)