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NATO ADVANCED RESEARCH WORKSHOP

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO SECURING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AGAINST TERRORISM

Fall, 2005

Background

The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 marked a revolutionary change in the nature of conflict and highlighted the international community’s need to develop corresponding new cooperative approaches to radiological security.

The potential terrorist threat posed by sealed radioactive sources is extremely high:

  • Firstly, they are ubiquitous – sealed sources are used all over the world for a wide range of peaceful purposes such as smoke detectors, medical devices and thermoelectric generators. As a result there are currently 2 million licensed sealed sources in the USA alone with at least 8 million identified sources worldwide.
  • Secondly, the small size, portability and relatively high value of sealed sources makes them vulnerable to misuse and theft – the IAEA reported 272 cases of illicit trafficking in sealed radioactive sources between 1993 and 2002.
  • Thirdly, there are major shortfalls in both international and national legislative and regulatory controls of sealed radioactive sources. Despite IAEA efforts to improve national regulatory infrastructures, the IAEA estimates that 110 countries worldwide still fail to impose adequate controls over sealed sources. Moreover, there are significant control shortfalls even in the countries with relatively strong regimes. The European Union’s member states lose up to 70 sealed radioactive sources annually, while the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimates that up to 250 sealed sources or devices are lost or stolen in America every year. As a result, the worldwide number of sealed sources in use, lost or stolen is unknown but the number of ‘orphan’ sources worldwide is generally estimated to be in the thousands.
  • Finally, at a technical level, it is relatively easy for terrorists to deploy sealed radioactive sources as terrorist weapons. A dispersion device combining highly radioactive material used in radiography such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, or iridium-192 packaged with conventional explosives would be highly effective in causing a high number of casualties and extensive economic damage. Even deploying a single canister of radioactive material without any explosive would be an effective terrorist weapon, for example, in 1987 a well-documented accident occurred in Brazil involving a cesium-137 sealed source which killed four, injured many and caused approximately $36 million in damages to the economy.

For further information contact:
Julia Fairrie, The Trilateral Group
Granville House, 132Sloane Street, London SW1X 9AX, United Kingdom
Tel: (+44) 207 591 4800; Fax: (+44) 207 591 4801
E-mail: Mail@trilat.com